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Recalibrating Our Empirical Understanding of
Inequitable Conduct
The belief that allegations of inequitable conduct in patent suits were—and remain—a 
disease has received widespread publicity and endorsement. Despite the extreme rarity of an 
ultimate finding of inequitable conduct,1 the empirical claim recently made by the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit sitting en banc in Therasense v. Becton Dickinson,2 by the 
proponents of the creation of the Supplemental Examination procedure that Congress passed 
and the President signed in the fall of 2011,3 and most recently by the Patent Office in its 
rules on Supplemental Examination,4 was that inequitable conduct is a plague, “appearing 
in nearly every patent suit.”5 The rarity of an ultimate finding of inequitable conduct is 
taken to bolster, rather than diminish, the argument in favor of weakening the doctrine: the 
inequitable conduct doctrine is a problem precisely because it is always pled though almost 
never found; it clutters up the administrative and litigation systems despite rarely existing in 
actuality.6
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Iowa College of Law. The author would like to thank Lee 
Petherbridge, David Schwartz, Jonas Anderson, Doru Cojoc, and Dennis Crouch for comments on an earlier 
draft of this article, as well as Courtney Burks and Zachary Pratt for excellent research assistance. 
1.  See Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen, & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An 
Empirical Assessment, 84 S. Cal. l. Rev. 1293, 1340 (2011) (finding that the Federal Circuit reached an ultimate 
conclusion that inequitable conduct was committed about 2.5 times a year for the period from 1983-2010).
2.  Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
3.  Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 Fed. CiR. B.J. 
539, 546 (2012). 
4.  Changes To Implement the Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
and To Revise Reexamination Fees, 77 Fed. Reg. 48828 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
5.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289 (quoting Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 
(Fed.Cir.1984)).
6.  See, e.g., id. (“Left unfettered, the inequitable conduct doctrine has plagued not only the courts but also 
the entire patent system. Because allegations of inequitable conduct are routinely brought on ‘the slenderest 
grounds,’ Burlington Indus., 849 F.2d at 1422, patent prosecutors constantly confront the specter of inequitable 
conduct charges.”). It should be noted that underlying this conclusion is another empirical assumption not 
addressed in this paper: that inequitable conduct rarely exists because it is rarely found by a court. It is entirely 
possible, however, that the most egregious cases of inequitable conduct never make their way to a court 
determination – they are settled between the parties without the facts of the inequitable conduct ever being 
made public or are made with regard to patents. 
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7.  While claims of the rate at which inequitable conduct has historically been pled are common, empirical 
studies are not. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 
24 BeRkeley TeCh. l.J. 723, 739 (2009) (“By recent estimates, the inequitable conduct defense is asserted in 
around one fourth of all patent cases filed.”); Benjamin Brown, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: A Standard 
in Motion, 19 FoRdham inTell. PRoP. media & enT. l.J. 593, 608 (2008) (“[C]ourts addressed, on average, 
inequitable conduct in less than 20% of all reported patent cases. This figure must be qualified, however, 
because it is almost impossible to ascertain the number of times inequitable conduct was pled, given that 
approximately 86% of patent cases settle.”); Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve 
Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BeRkeley TeCh. l.J. 147, 155–56 & tbl.1 (2006) (“[F]rom 2000 
to 2004, an inequitable conduct adjudication appeared in 16% to 35% of all reported patent opinions . . . . [I]
t can be inferred that the percent of patent cases in which a litigant ple[d] inequitable conduct is substantially 
higher than these figures.”); see also 155 Cong. Rec. S2715 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2009) (statement of Sen. Hatch) 
(“The inequitable conduct defense is frequently pled, rarely proven, and always drives up the cost of litigation 
tremendously.”).
8.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289.
9.  Committee Position Paper, The Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct and the Duty of Candor in Patent 
Prosecution: Its Current Adverse Impact on the Operation of the United States Patent System, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 
74 (1988); Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 53 aRiz. l. 
Rev. 735, 737 n.2 (2011). In any event, the relevance of the rate at which inequitable conduct was pled in 1988 
is of dubious relevance to the rate at which it was being pled contemporaneously with the Therasense decision. 
10.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289.
11.  Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct, 24 
BeRkeley TeCh. l.J. 1329, 1358 (2009) (concluding that a defense of inequitable conduct was raised in about 
40% of all patent cases filed in 2007 and 2008).
12.  Besides the Mammen study, the sole other empirical study of the rate at which inequitable conduct is pled 
of which I am aware is a 2011 report by five researchers at LexMachina that found that inequitable conduct 
was pled in 3,033, out of 13,786 total patent infringement cases (about 22% of cases) for the period between 
January 1, 2005 and May 31, 2010. That study does not provide any more refined data on pleadings than these 
numbers, and does not appear to have been subsequently cited. lex maChina, inequiTaBle ConduCT deFenSe 
in PaTenT liTigaTion (2005–2010) (Jan. 15, 2011) https://lexmachina.com/2011/01/15/inequitable-conduct-
defense-in-patent-litigation-2005-2010/ (select “Download” to access the report).
Surprisingly, however, the empirical evidence cited to support these claims is slender. 
While assertions about the rate at which inequitable conduct is pled are common, they 
are largely unsupported by any actual data.7 In Therasense, for example, the court cited 
a 1988 “Position Essay” prepared by a committee of the American Intellectual Property 
Law Association as a study that “estimated that eighty percent of patent infringement cases 
included allegations of inequitable conduct.”8 The “Position Essay,” however, contained no 
data or other evidence to support its estimate.9
More robust was the court’s citation of Dr. Christian Mammen’s 2009 empirical study of 
inequitable conduct.10 This was logical: Mammen’s study was a strong work of scholarship 
that provided a thorough, well-explained empirical analysis of inequitable conduct claims 
from start to finish, from the pleading stage to their ultimate outcome at the Federal 
Circuit.11 It was the first, and to date only, study to address the “plague” claim using such a 
comprehensive set of empirical data.12 
100 IP THEORY   Volume 3:  Issue 2
13.  See Mammen, supra note 11 at 1358.
14.  See e.g., Cotter, supra note 9, at 737 n.2 (citing Mammen for the 40% figure); Sona De, The Inequitable 
Conduct Defense: Before and After Therasense, 24 inTell. PRoP. & TeCh. l.J. 15, 15 (2012) (citing Mammen for 
the 10-fold increase); Jeffrey M. Kuhn, Information Overload at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Reframing 
the Duty of Disclosure in Patent Law As a Search and Filter Problem, 13 yale J.l & TeCh. 90, 92 (2010); Christian 
Mammen, Revisiting the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct Before the Patent and Trademark Office, 21 FoRdham 
inTell. PRoP. media & enT. l.J. 1007, n.11 (2011) (citing the 2009 study for its chart showing the steady increase 
in assertions of the defense); Zhe (Amy) Peng et al., A Panacea for Inequitable Conduct Problems or Kingsdown 
Version 2.0? The Therasense Decision and a Look into the Future of U.S. Patent Law Reform, 16 va. J.l. & TeCh. 
373, 388 (2011) (reprinting the Mammen data); Nicole H. Kattah & Rebecca M. McNeil, Patent Legislation—
Meeting the Challenges of Reform?, Finnegan (Jan. 28, 2011) available at http://www.finnegan.com/resources/
articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=55afa121-df47-4a71-9f49-028499843331 (citing Mammen for the 40% figure). 
15.  Changes To Implement the Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act and To Revise Reexamination Fees, 77 Fed. Reg. 48828 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 
1) (“Note that inequitable conduct is pled in approximately 40 percent of the patent cases filed annually in the 
U.S. District Courts” and also citing Mammen for the chart “estimating the steady increase in assertions of the 
inequitable conduct defense.“).
16.  In theory, the Supreme Court could grant certiorari on a question involving the doctrine of inequitable 
conduct. Although the doctrine is itself rooted in a trio of Supreme Court decisions from the 1930’s and 40’s, 
see Therasense 649 F.3d at 1306, the Court has never granted certiorari on a petition involving inequitable 
conduct in its modern form. 
17.  See Petherbridge, Rantanen, & Mojibi, supra note 1; Donald R. Dunner, et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal 
Circuit’s Patent Decisions: 1982–1994, 5 Fed. CiR. B.J. 151, 173 tbl. 4 (1995). For a comprehensive summary of 
empirical literature on inequitable conduct, see Petherbridge, Rantanen, & Mojibi, supra note 1, at fn. 30.
18.  See, e.g., Mammen, supra note 11, at 1354 (finding an average of 2.5 Federal Circuit rulings of inequitable 
conduct per year from 1983-2008); Petherbridge, Rantanen, & Mojibi, supra note 1, at 1340 (same for the 
period 1983-2010). See also, Dunner, et al., supra note 17, at 173 tbl. 4 (1995) (finding inequitable conduct in 
19% of the appeals addressed between October 1, 1982–March 15, 1994).
While the Mammen study provides a number of results regarding inequitable conduct 
(the majority of which are undisturbed by this analysis), the primary evidence supporting 
the “plague” claim was a reported ten-fold increase in the rate at which inequitable conduct 
was pled between the years 2000 and 2008, increasing from a rate of 4% of patent cases in 
2000 to 40% of patent cases by 2008,13 a figure that has been cited by commentators14 and 
the Patent Office in its Rules on Supplemental Examination.15 It also represents the primary 
(and perhaps sole) actual empirical data supporting the claim of a dramatic increase in 
pleadings of inequitable conduct.
In contrast, substantially more empirical data is available about the other end of the 
lifecycle of an inequitable conduct claim, that is, its final fate before the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.16 In addition to the Mammen study, which also looked 
at the outcome of appeals involving inequitable conduct before the Federal Circuit, there 
are multiple studies providing data on outcomes at the Federal Circuit level.17 These studies 
have found that the Federal Circuit rarely reaches an ultimate conclusion of inequitable 
conduct: historically, the frequency averaged about two-and-a-half times a year for the 
period from 1983-2010.18
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19.  Petherbridge, Rantanen, & Mojibi, supra note 1; see also Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen, & R. Polk 
Wagner, Unenforceability (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2167417 
(empirically examining the differences between patents found unenforceable and several other types of patents 
and concluding that the doctrine is likely to be operating better than the conventional wisdom would suggest).
20.  Mammen, supra note 11, at 1357, tbl.2.
21.  Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing a study that 
“estimated that eighty percent of patent infringement cases included allegations of inequitable conduct”).
This Essay focuses primarily on the first quantitative issue: the rate at which inequitable 
conduct is pled. Despite routinely being the subject of empirical claims, there is surprisingly 
little data to draw upon. This Essay examines the only prior study to address this issue and 
builds on that study’s approach to provide a clearer picture of the pleading rate for inequitable 
conduct. The purpose of this Essay is thus not to develop a refined theory of inequitable 
conduct based on a detailed empirical examination of the Federal Circuit’s inequitable conduct 
jurisprudence; that has been done elsewhere.19 Rather, its goal is to apply relatively simple and 
straightforward techniques that can be easily replicated in order to better understand the rate 
at which inequitable conduct claims are asserted. 
The results of this approach reveal that while pleadings involving inequitable conduct 
did – probably – experience a modest increase from 2000 to 2008, the “strong upward trend” 
of 4% to 40%20 is implausible, as is the Federal Circuit’s assertion of an 80% pleading rate 
in Therasense.21 More significantly, to the extent one accepts that meaningful patterns can 
be established by a few years’ worth of data, as courts, the patent office, and commentators 
seem willing to do, since 2008, allegations of inequitable conduct have fallen precipitously, 
at least to the extent they can be measured by Answers and Counterclaims. In 2008, 41% 
of patent cases in which Answers were filed contained the term “inequitable conduct” in 
an Answer; for 2012, that rate fell to 21%. Federal Circuit determinations of inequitable 
conduct remain rare, of course; one would expect nothing else - particularly in light of 
Exergen and Therasense. 
Beyond the immediate issue of inequitable conduct, however, the analysis presented by 
this Essay raises a greater issue about the use of empirical studies. Empirical legal studies 
present a dilemma: they are an extremely valuable tool, but at the same time carry a risk of 
misuse and error. As illustrated by the example addressed in this Essay, such studies can be 
misused even when the scholar creating the study does everything necessary to make the 
study as transparent as possible. The final section of this Essay addresses this issue, arguing 
for greater scholarly engagement with (as opposed to passive citation of) empirical legal 
studies.
I. The RaTe aT Which inequiTable conducT is Pled
Inequitable conduct is a doctrine whose oft-described purpose is to ensure that patent 
applicants act with candor in their dealings with the patent office during the ex parte process 
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22.  Petherbridge, Rantanen, & Mojibi, supra note 1, at 1296. This is the primary justification given for 
the doctrine; other theories have been articulated as well. See, e.g. Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, 
Commentary, Toward a System of Invention Registration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 miCh. l. 
Rev. FiRST imPReSSionS 24 (2011).
23.  Ryan Vacca, Patent Reform and Best Mode: A Signal to the Patent Office or a Step Toward Elimination?, 
75 alB. l. Rev. 279 (2012).
24.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1285.
25.  See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (relevant part 
en banc) (“When a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct occurred in relation to one or more 
claims during prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent is rendered unenforceable.”).
26.  6 donald S. ChiSum, ChiSum on PaTenTS § 19.03 [6][b][ii] (2007). An inequitable conduct claim might 
also be raised by an alleged infringer in an initial Declaratory Judgment Complaint; however, this is unlikely 
to substantially impact the results of this study given that a patent holder will almost inevitably respond to the 
Declaratory Judgment Complaint with a counter-assertion of patent infringement, thus causing the accused 
infringer to re-assert its inequitable conduct claim as a defense and leading, for purposes of this study, to a 
“hit.” 
27.  See, e.g., Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276; Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178, 1181 (Fed.
Cir.1995); Petherbridge, Rantanen & Mojibi, supra note 1, at 1297–98. A third doctrinal step, the “balancing 
of the equities” has also long been considered part of the inequitable conduct inquiry, but in practice it rarely 
affects the outcome. See Petherbridge, Rantanen & Mojibi, supra note 1, at 1321.
28.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287–90. 
of patent examination.22 Unlike most other mechanisms that police a party’s behavior in 
interacting with the government through government-imposed consequences,23 inequitable 
conduct is a defense and counterclaim that may be raised by another private party, namely, 
the accused infringer in a patent suit.24 A successful inequitable conduct claim is potent: it 
may render the entire patent unenforceable.25 Inequitable conduct is thus both an affirmative 
defense that may be raised by an accused infringer and a counterclaim that may be asserted; 
in either case it must be pled with particularity.26 
The fundamental elements of an inequitable conduct claim have long been constant: 
the requirement of materiality, which involves an inquiry into the severity of the patent 
applicant’s wrongful conduct, and the requirement of intent, which involves a parallel 
inquiry into whether the material act or omission was committed with the “intent to 
deceive” the patent office.27 This is not to say that there has been unwavering and consistent 
application of these elements; Therasense itself illustrates that both materiality and intent 
have each been subject to wide disagreement over the relevant standards, and Therasense 
itself altered the way they are analyzed.28
 A. Limitations of the Prior Study
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that the Mammen study was a substantial 
and important contribution to the literature on inequitable conduct. It was the first to 
thoroughly investigate inequitable conduct over the entire lifespan of the Federal Circuit 
using empirical data, and it approached the issue from a variety of perspectives. In addition 
102
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29.  See Petherbridge, Rantanen, & Mojibi, supra note 1, at 1300, 1311, 1313, 1341 (confirming Mammen’s 
findings on issues relating to Federal Circuit appeals of inequitable conduct).
30.  Mammen, supra note 11, at 1361. 
31.  Data from 1991 to 1999 is omitted from Mammen Table 2. Although Mammen’s searches of pleadings 
extended back to 1991, he himself expressed skepticism about the reliability of the period prior to 2000. Id. at 
1349 n. 87. 
to its groundbreaking nature, it was also an extremely transparent study: Mammen carefully 
reported each step of the methodology he employed in great detail so that it could be 
replicated by future scholars; far more detail, in fact, than many empirical legal studies 
provide. Indeed, this Essay would have involved a substantially greater undertaking if 
Mammen had not been so transparent with his methodology. In addition, many of the 
observations of the study remain completely undisturbed by the limitations discussed below; 
indeed, some were subsequently confirmed.29 The purpose of the following discussion is 
simply to subject a narrow slice of the study to scholarly critique; it is in no way intended to 
challenge the study as a whole.
That narrow slice involves Mammen’s observation of a dramatic rise in the rate at which 
inequitable conduct was being pled, which led him to conclude that “the prevalence of 
inequitable conduct cases is expanding, especially at the pleading stage.”30 For reference, the 
relevant portion the key table from the 2009 study is below.31 
Figure 1: Table 2 from Mammen, “Controlling the Plague”
A B C D E F G H















IC No IC DCT Vacated
2000 2484 110 4% 3 11 1 2.73% 0.12%
2001 2520 200 8% 2 16 0 1.00% 0.08%
2002 2700 362 13% 2 8 2 0.55% 0.07%
2003 2814 565 20% 2 13 2 0.35% 0.07%
2004 3075 759 25% 0 4 2 0.00% 0.00%
2005 2720 827 30% 5 6 3 0.60% 0.18%
2006 2830 926 33% 3 16 3 0.32% 0.11%
2007 2896 1148 40% 5 6 1 0.44% 0.17%
2008 2909 1157 40% 4 14 1 0.35% 0.14%
On its face, Mammen’s Table 2 appears to support the concept of a growing plague 
of inequitable conduct claims. It indicates that between 2000 and 2008, the number of 
pleadings containing “inequitable conduct” went from 110 to 1157, resulting in an increase 
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32.  Mammen, supra note 11, at 1349–50 n. 82–88.
33.  The empirical support for this assertion is provided in Table 1. It reflects a 620% increase in Answers and 
Counterclaims that contain the term “patent” that are searchable in Westlaw from the 2000 to the 2008. Indeed, 
searching for almost any term in this database will likely lead to a similar increase. For example, searching 
for the term “chicken” in this database produces 285 results for 2000 and 1610 for 2008, an increase of 635%. 
(“chicken” search conducted on December 6, 2012).
34.  Mammen’s procedure describes drawing data on numbers of pleadings from Westlaw and the Stanford IP 
Clearinghouse (now known as LexMachina) and data on numbers of patent cases filed in a given year from the 
U.S. Courts annual reports. See Mammen, supra note 11, at 1349–50 n. 82–88. 
35.  For example, in Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., Case No. 05c5373 (N.D. Ill.), Abbott filed at least a 
Complaint, First Amended Complaint, Second Amended Complaint, and Third Amended Complaint; various 
accused infringers filed Answers and Counterclaims in response each. 
of the rate at which inequitable conduct was being pled from 4% of patent cases to 40% of 
patent cases. A plague indeed. 
There are two significant limitations of this data, however, that subsequent users of the 
data have failed to consider, leading to overreliance on the results from the 2009 study. 
Fortunately, Mammen provided complete details of his process for collecting the above 
data. Thus, Mammen’s study can be replicated, a key element of validity for any empirical 
study of this type, and those limitations identified and addressed.
First, to collect his data, Mammen searched Westlaw’s Answers and Counterclaims 
database for documents containing both of the terms “inequitable conduct” and “patents,” 
and reported the number of hits.32 This approach, while an appealing methodology, is 
subject to artifacts that result from the composition of the Westlaw database. Particularly 
significant to this study that there is strong reason to suspect that the completeness of 
Westlaw’s electronic database of court filings is not consistent over all time periods studied; 
to the contrary, the size of Westlaw’s database has a direct, positive correlation with the 
year, at least for the period 2000 to approximately 2007.33 Put another way, Westlaw 
contains a substantially greater number of patent-related pleadings in general for the year 
2008 than for the year 2000, likely because during the early part of the decade most courts 
did not utilize electronic dockets that Westlaw can easily draw from. The result is that there 
is strong reason to suspect that Table 2 from the Mammen study may be providing data 
about an increase in the contents of the Westlaw database from 2000 to 2008, rather than on 
an increasing number of inequitable conduct pleadings. 
A second crucial limitation of the data reported in Table 2 of the 2009 study is that it compares 
pleadings filed to cases filed to arrive at a percentage of cases that involved a claim of inequitable 
conduct.34 Absent prior knowledge of a one-to-one ratio of Answers and Counterclaims to cases, 
this comparison is an apples-to-oranges calculation. Indeed, rather than assuming a one-to-one 
ratio, the opposite assumption is more plausible, given that patent cases often involve multiple 
accused infringers and multiple iterations of Complaints, Answers and Counterclaims.35 These 
First Amended Complaints, Second Amended Complaints, etc. typically restate the same 
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36.  To get a sense of how many Answers are typically filed in a patent case, I conducted an advanced search on 
LexMachina, limited to “patent” cases filed between 1/1/2005 and 1/10/2005, and limited the results to “answers.” 
This resulted in 538 documents across 93 cases with a mean of 5.8, a median of 4, and a range of 1-58. The search was 
conducted on September 28, 2012.
37.  For the Westlaw data, the specific procedure involved searching the “Westlaw Classic” FED-FILING-ALL 
database, limited in the document template drop down menu to “Search Pleadings” and in the checkbox to “Answers 
and Counterclaims,” and using the search phrase ‘“inequitable conduct” & patent & da(=yyyy).’ The number of “hits” 
(i.e.: documents meeting those search criteria) are reported in Table 1. The search was conducted on February 18, 2013.
38.  The procedure was identical to the procedure used to obtain the first set of data except that the search 
phrase used was ‘patent & da(=yyyy).’ 
39.  Due to their nature, online databases are constantly subject to improvement, and thus may become more 
complete over time even with respect to past periods. This is particularly true with documents such as court filings, 
as the material available at any given point in time on Westlaw represents only a subset of the entire population. 
Thus, a search conducted at a different point in time will likely exhibit at least minor variations in totals as Westlaw 
backfills with past documents. However, as a comparison between Table 2 of Mammen and Table 1 above reveals, 
these variations appear to be relatively minor (ex.: an increase in the database completeness of about 4% for the year 
2008), and there is no reason to conclude that they would be more likely to have a greater effect on the number of 
pleadings containing “inequitable conduct” & patent than pleadings containing only “patent” (and vice versa). 
allegations and should not be counted multiple times. In addition, where there are multiple 
accused infringers in a single patent suit, the accused infringers will typically piggy-back on 
the allegations made by each other. Consequently, even if one assumes that Westlaw’s 
database was reasonably complete by 2008, the process of comparing pleadings to cases 
will overstate the number of cases in which inequitable conduct was actually alleged. For 
example, if one hypothesizes that four Answers and Counterclaims, on average, were filed 
in each patent case, then a direct comparison of pleadings to cases (without taking this factor 
into account) would cause the rate at which inequitable conduct was being pled to appear 
to be four times what it actually is. In actuality, this assumption is probably fairly close, or 
perhaps even a bit low.36
The net result of these two limitations is that they raise a serious question as to whether 
the 2009 study simply reports on the growing completeness of the databases that were 
searched, and whether the ratios calculated in the study are indicative of the rates at which 
inequitable conduct was actually being pled in patent cases. 
 B. Recalibrating the Measure of Pleadings
Due to Mammen’s careful recordation of his procedures, however, the limitations described 
above may be overcome by recalibrating the approach described in the 2009 study to yield 
a more accurate picture. To obtain the data presented in this section, I conducted the same 
search performed by Mammen on the same database, that is, I searched Westlaw’s “Pleadings” 
database for “Answers and Counterclaims” containing the search terms “‘inequitable conduct’ 
& patent on a yearly basis.37 To properly calibrate this data, I also conducted a search in which 
I used only the term “patent,” thus establishing a baseline of the size of the Westlaw population 
of those pleadings.38 The results are presented in Table I below.39 
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40.  To assess whether or not these results actually involved Answers or Counterclaims alleging inequitable conduct, 
a randomly selected sample of ten of the documents returned for the search involving “inequitable conduct” were 
selected and examined for the years 2000, 2005 and 2010. Of the ten results for 2000, all involved Answers, with 
inequitable conduct pled in eight; two were Answers to Counterclaims alleging inequitable conduct. Of the ten 
results for 2005, nine were Answers pleading inequitable conduct. All ten results for 2010 were Answers; six 
pled inequitable conduct, two were reservations of a right to amend, and two were responses to Counterclaims of 
inequitable conduct. Although these samples are small, they indicate that, if anything, the numbers in Table 1 may 
overstate the rate at which inequitable conduct is pled. 
41.  As discussed further below, these results do not in any way indicate the quality of the inequitable conduct 
claims. This is an important limitation on the methodology used by both this study and the 2009 study, as the 
presence of “token” inequitable conduct claims in the data reported in Tables 1 and 2 may lead to the erroneous 
conclusion that substantive allegations of inequitable conduct are more common than they actually are. Of 
course, one might be concerned about these “token” inequitable conduct claims; absent meaningful information 
about their prevalence and effects, however, it is difficult to draw any significant conclusions about their impact.
Table 1: Answers and Counterclaims Filed Per Year (Westlaw)
Year “Patent” “Patent” & “Inequitable Conduct”
% of patent Answers & 
Counterclaims
2000 641 112 17%
2001 1212 211 17%
2002 1943 367 19%
2003 3279 573 17%
2004 4776 771 16%
2005 3548 838 24%
2006 3952 945 24%
2007 4508 1185 26%
2008 3990 1203 30%
2009 3937 1023 26%
2010 3645 911 25%
2011 2282 452 20%
2012 2511 402 16%
The data in Table 1 present a strikingly different picture of inequitable conduct allegations 
in pleadings than provided by Table 2 of the 2009 study. As a percentage of Answers and 
Counterclaims in Westlaw containing the term “patent,” the term “inequitable conduct” 
appeared in about 17% in 2000; rose to a high of 30% in 2008, and has fallen since.40 While 
this data supports the claim of an upward trend from 2000 to 2008, it is much less supportive 
of a claim that allegations “skyrocketed.”41 More importantly, since 2008 the trend of alleging 
inequitable conduct is downward, with inequitable conduct being pled less and less often. 
This data, while informative, nevertheless tells us little about the rate at which inequitable 
conduct is being alleged in cases. Perhaps, one might argue, the above results are largely 
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42.  For example, in the sample discussed in footnote 36, one case had 58 Answers filed.
43.  lexmaChina, https://lexmachina.com/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (previously known as the Stanford IP Litigation 
Clearinghouse). This search involved conducting an “advanced search,” restricted to patent cases and answers, using the 
search term “inequitable conduct,” with a date restriction of pleadings docketed between 1/1/yyyy and 12/31/yyyy. The 
searches were then repeated without the term “inequitable conduct.” Results were then limited to those that involved 
“documents” (as opposed to docket entries) and organized by “Cases”; hits were counted on that basis. Because of a 
technical limitation imposed by LexMachina, viz. a limit of 2000 cases per search when organized by case, both search 
series were further broken up into two groups: The 1st through 5th Circuits and the 6th through 12th and D.C. Circuits, 
with the totals combined for a given year. All searches were conducted on February 18, 2013. Compare with Mammen, 
supra note 11 at 1349, fns. 85-86. Note that Mammen’s search of LexMachina imposed a date restriction on the year 
cases were filed, rather than on the filing date of the pleadings. However, responsive pleadings involving inequitable 
conduct need not be filed in the same year as the case was filed. As a consequence, the results of answer the question 
“How many answers containing “inequitable conduct” were filed at any time for cases filed in a given year?” as 
opposed to the question “How many answers containing “inequitable conduct” were filed in a given year?” 
44.  As with the Westlaw data, to assess the quality of the results, a randomly selected sample of ten cases that 
LexMachina identified as containing an Answer with “inequitable conduct” were selected for the years 2000, 
2005 and 2010, and the documents for those cases examined. Of the ten results for 2000, all involved Answers, 
with inequitable conduct pled in eight; one was an answer to a Counterclaim alleging inequitable conduct (the 
counterclaim was not in LexMachina) and one was a preservation of a right to amend the pleading to add a claim of 
inequitable conduct. Of the ten results for 2005, all involved Answers, with inequitable conduct pled in eight; one 
was a preservation of a right to amend and the last did not involve a claim of inequitable conduct claim. All 
ten results for 2010 were Answers that pled inequitable conduct. Note that these results say nothing about the 
quality of the inequitable conduct claims; some were merely token claims. 
driven by a small number of infringement suits in which there were many Answers filed.42 
Thus, to obtain this information, I conducted a similar search using an alternate data 
repository, LexMachina.43 Table 2 reports on the results of a search of LexMachina in which 
the units of analysis are cases, rather than documents.44 
Table 2: Patent Cases with Pleadings of Inequitable Conduct (LexMachina)
Year Patent Cases with an Answer Patent Cases with an Answer Containing “Inequitable Conduct” Percentage
2000 233 60 26%
2001 420 136 32%
2002 726 220 30%
2003 1,026 328 32%
2004 1,421 455 32%
2005 1,565 549 35%
2006 1,750 603 34%
2007 1,914 773 40%
2008 2,093 863 41%
2009 2,000 742 37%
2010 2,094 741 35%
2011 2,453 706 29%
2012 3,277 698 21%
IP THEORY   Volume 3: Issue 2
45.  In other words, the above evidence suggests that the 40% figure reported in the Mammen study was 
accurate for the year 2008, despite the methodological issues discussed above. This may be due to the under-
inclusiveness of the Westlaw court filings database and the erroneous assumption of a one-to-one ratio of 
pleadings-to-cases canceling each other out for that specific year.
46.  Again, note that these results indicate nothing about the quality of those inequitable conduct pleadings, in 
that they include both substantive claims and “token” claims. 
47.  ChiSum, supra note 26, at § 19.03 [6][b][ii]. An inequitable conduct claim might also be raised in a Declaratory 
Judgment Complaint, although for some of the practical reasons discussed below, this may be difficult. 
48.  “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Resources, Inc. v. 
Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1344 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“[I]nequitable conduct, while a broader concept than 
fraud, must be pled with particularity.”).
49.  Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
50.  Id.
51.  Lisa A. Dolak, Beware the Inequitable Conduct Charge! (Why Practitioners Submit What They Submit), 
91 J. PaT. & TRademaRk oFF. SoC’y 558, 569 (2009); Thomas L. Irving et al., The Evolution of Intent: A 
Review of Patent Law Cases Invoking the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct from Precision to Exergen, 35 u. 
dayTon l. Rev. 303, 321 (2010); David O. Taylor, Patent Fraud, 83 TemP. l. Rev. 49, 72–73 (2010); Priscilla 
G. Taylor, Note, Bringing Equity Back to the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine?, 27 BeRkeley TeCh. l.J. 349, 367 
(2012). 
The results presented in Table 2 are consistent with the results of Table 1, in that both 
show a moderate increase in inequitable conduct pleadings through 2008, followed by a 
substantial decline. For example, of the 233 patent cases in which Answers were filed in 
2000 that are collected in LexMachina, 60, or 26%, have an Answer that also contains the 
term “inequitable conduct.” By 2008, that percentage had risen to 41%.45 Furthermore, as 
with the percentages of Answers filed per year alleging inequitable conduct, the percentage 
of cases involving new pleadings containing an inequitable conduct claim has fallen—to 
about 21% of cases in 2012.46 
 An instinctive reaction to this data might be to speculate on causation. On the 
surface, they seem to be consistent with the hypothesis that the Federal Circuit’s attempts to 
limit the inequitable conduct doctrine have had a significant impact on patent challengers’ 
willingness to assert inequitable conduct claims. As previously noted, an inequitable 
conduct claim is both an affirmative defense that may be raised by an accused infringer and 
a counterclaim that may be pled.47 As a claim that inherently involves fraud or mistake, its 
elements must be stated with particularity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).48 
While this has long been a requirement, in its 2009 Exergen opinion the Federal Circuit 
provided new guidance on the requirements of pleading inequitable conduct, holding that 
the pleading must identify “the specific who, what, when, where, and how of the material 
misrepresentation or omission committed before the PTO.”49 The court further held that 
pleadings must “allege sufficient underlying facts from which a court may reasonably 
infer that a party acted with the requisite state of mind.”50 Exergen has been widely viewed 
as substantially tightening the standards for pleading inequitable conduct.51 The Federal 
Circuit’s opinion in Therasense, which heightened the standards for establishing both 
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52.  Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
53.  Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation As an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 SanTa 
ClaRa ComPuTeR & high TeCh. l.J. 159, 187–89 (2006).
54.  A linear regression of time [2000-2012] versus the percentage data from table 2 produced a slope variable 
with a p-value of 0.87; in contrast, a linear regression of time [2000-2008] versus the percentage data produced a 
slope variable with a p-value < 0.001 and an adjusted R-squared of 0.83 indicating a high degree of correlation. 
55.  I acknowledge that “bald” or “token” assertions of inequitable conduct are only one way to measure 
quality. It is conceivable that a party could plead inequitable conduct in great detail and the claim could still be 
completely meritless.
the materiality and intent elements,52 likely accelerated this trend by both diminishing the 
incentive to plead inequitable conduct (because defendants are less likely to succeed on it) 
and making it harder to actually plead (because the elements of materiality and intent are 
more difficult to allege).
A second possible explanation is that despite the substantial benefits associated with 
a successful inequitable conduct claim,53 at least a set of accused infringers may have 
independently arrived at the conclusion that inequitable conduct is perhaps not the most 
efficacious or efficient weapon to use except in a limited set of cases where the pacts are 
particularly favorable to the patent challenger. While the benefits of a successful inequitable 
conduct claim are indeed great, sometimes those benefits may be outweighed by the cost 
of advancing the claim, particularly in cases where it is relatively weak compared to other 
more routine defenses such as obviousness. Perhaps, in other words, inequitable conduct 
was something of a fad, and when parties and lawyers realized that it was not a panacea for 
patent infringement, they stopped alleging it in every situation. 
Or perhaps the decline beginning in 2009 was caused by the economy; perhaps a 
combination of factors; perhaps something else entirely. 
Or perhaps that initial instinct of explaining the variation is just mistaken. Perhaps the data 
reflected in the above charts is simply random variation in pleadings over time. Regressed over 
the entire time period, there is no statistically significant relationship.54 Perhaps next year we 
will see an uptick in pleadings of inequitable conduct. The bottom line is that we should be 
cautious about extending out trend lines based on the existence of the line alone; we should 
instead make sure that expectations for the future are based on reasons, not extrapolations.
***
Even with the recalibration undertaken in this study, there are substantial questions 
left unanswered about inequitable conduct allegations. Two are particularly salient to 
questions of causality and interpretation. First, the above data simply reports on quantity 
of pleadings; they provide no information on their quality, a significant issue given 
that at least some of the inequitable conduct assertions contained in these pleadings 
are nothing more than bald assertions of inequitable conduct.55 During a quality-control 
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56.  See, e.g., “Defendant’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses,” Hodgdon Powder Company, Inc. v. Clean Shot 
Technologies, Inc., Case No. 00-8394-Civ-HURLEY/LYNCH (S.D. Fla.), filed June 28, 2000.
57.  The available data suggest that district courts make a substantive determination on inequitable conduct 
claims about 25-35 times a year. See inequiTaBle ConduCT deFenSe in PaTenT liTigaTion (2005–2010) supra 
note 14 (reporting that district courts made a substantive determination on inequitable conduct in 200 cases 
between January 1, 2005 and May 31, 2010); Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Note, Inequitable Conduct Claims in 
the 21st Century: Combating the Plague, 20 BeRkeley TeCh. l.J.147 (2005) (estimating that 244 allegations of 
inequitable conduct were decided in district courts between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2004). 
58.  See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289.
review of the study, I noticed a number of pleadings along the lines of “The applicable 
doctrines of anticipation, inequitable conduct and public domain bar any recovery 
by Plaintiff in this case.”56 I came to think of these claims as “token” inequitable 
conduct claims. Further empirical work is necessary to ascertain the degree to which 
the above data represent non-token allegations of inequitable conduct. In particular, 
it is conceivable that the downward trend in pleadings since 2008 is a result of the 
elimination of these token inequitable conduct claims, rather than a meaningful shift in 
non-token claims.
Second, to better understand the landscape of inequitable conduct claims, and the 
burden they impose on patent litigation generally, further empirical work on the rate 
at which pleadings of inequitable conduct proceed to an actual determination by a 
district court is necessary. The data that is available suggests that substantive district 
court determinations of inequitable conduct are, while not rare, at least uncommon, 
and factual evaluations of the issue are even rarer.57 If a substantial proportion of 
inequitable conduct allegations are of the token type, however, the ratio between 
inequitable conduct pleadings and determinations may perhaps not have been as great 
as believed. 
Despite these limitations, the data reported in this study provides an important update 
to our understanding of inequitable conduct pleadings. First, the data are inconsistent 
with the claim that inequitable conduct claims were raised “in nearly every patent 
suit,”58 even at the high point of the range in 2008. Second, they suggest that the 
claim of a ten-fold skyrocketing of inequitable conduct pleadings from 2000 to 2008 
is unfounded. Third, while they are consistent with a claim of a modest upward trend 
in inequitable conduct allegations from 2000-2008, the data suggest that assertions of 
inequitable conduct have fallen substantially over the last few years and are trending 
downwards. 
ii. The RaTe aT Which inequiTable conducT claims succeed aT The FedeRal ciRcuiT
At the other end of the cycle of an inequitable conduct claim is the claim’s ultimate fate 
before the Federal Circuit. Prior to Therasense, these determinations were uncommon: the 
Federal Circuit addressed the issue of inequitable conduct in its written opinions only about 
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59.  This number was arrived at by dividing 338 cases involving inequitable conduct, the number reported by 
Petherbridge, Rantanen, & Mojibi, supra note 1, at 1305 n.40, by 27, by the number of years that study covered. 
In contrast, the Federal Circuit has historically addressed the issue of obviousness about 23 times per year. See 
Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the 
Law of Obviousness, 85 Tex. l. Rev. 2051, 2072 (2006) (reporting 362 identified Federal Circuit opinions on 
obviousness for the period January 1, 1990 to June 1, 2005). Note that not all of these determinations resulted in a 
final disposition of the issue; in some cases, the case was remanded for further proceedings. 
60.  Petherbridge, Rantanen, & Mojibi, supra note 1, at 1340.
61.  In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litigation, 703 F.3d 511 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Outside the Box Innovations, 
LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc., 695 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 1st Media, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 694 F.3d 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., 694 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Aventis Pharma 
S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Powell v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 663 F.3d 1221 (Fed. 
Cir 2011); Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 658 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011); August Tech. Corp. v. 
Camtek, Ltd., 655 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2011); American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 651 
F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
62.  Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
twelve-and-a-half times a year on average.59 Determinations that inequitable conduct was 
actually committed were even rarer: prior to Therasense, the Federal Circuit reached an 
ultimate conclusion of inequitable conduct around 2.5 times per year.60
Since Therasense, determinations that inequitable conduct occurred have become, if 
anything, even more infrequent: in the twenty-two months since Therasense issued, the 
Federal Circuit has issued written opinions addressing inequitable conduct only nine times.61 
Of these nine opinions, in only one did the Federal Circuit reach an ultimate conclusion 
that inequitable conduct had been committed - in that case, the Federal Circuit affirmed a 
district court’s finding of inequitable conduct.62 While these numbers are small, given the 
recentness of Therasense, it appears that at the Federal Circuit level, inequitable conduct 
determinations are likely to remain rare and ultimate conclusions of inequitable conduct 
even rarer.
iii. WhaT can be done
As the example discussed above illustrates, empirical legal studies present a dilemma: 
on the one hand, they are fundamentally necessary to answer questions about the effect of 
legal doctrines; on the other, they may be subject to misuse and error. What can be done 
to shrink the bull’s horns? In this section, I raise several suggestions that in many fields 
are fundamental components of empirical research yet tend to be often overlooked in legal 
studies. 
As a starting point, study authors themselves are in the best position to ensure that 
their studies are valid. Authors can follow a number of procedures to ensure the quality of 
their studies. First, in designing and carrying out their studies, authors can follow a set of 
methodological best practices, such as those suggested by Hall & Wright in their seminal 
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63.  Mark A. Hall and Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 63, 
100-120 (2008). 
64.  Even with a fully replicable methodology, it may often be impossible for subsequent researchers to 
precisely duplicate the results because case coding frequently involves at least some level of judgment, 
and different people can reasonably disagree, especially over close calls. This may be particularly true in 
the case of actual “content analysis” studies, in which the coder is assessing (frequently as an expert) the 
judicial reasoning employed by the court. This does not mean that the empirical study is invalid; rather, that 
uncertainty is simply a recognized part of the analysis.
65.  When datasets are available, subsequent researchers gain the ability to precisely duplicate the results from 
the analysis-stage forward, mitigating the limitation discussed in the preceding footnote.
66.  See, e.g., Petherbridge, Rantanen & Mojibi, supra note 1.
67.  See Christopher Anthony Cotropia & Lee Petherbridge, The Dominance of Teams in the Production 
of Legal Knowledge, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2212431 (providing 
empirical evidence that team research is on average more frequently cited than individual research and that 
teams are more likely than individuals to produce exceptionally high impact research). 
68.  One notable recent example is the commentary following the publication of Colleen Chien’s Predicting 
Patent Litigation, 90 Texas L. Rev. 283 (2011). See Lee Petherbridge, On Predicting Patent Litigation, 
90 Texas L. Rev. See Also 75 (2012); Jay P. Kesan, David Schartz & Ted Sichelman, Paving the Path to 
Accurately Predicting Legal Outcomes: A Comment on Professor Chien’s Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 
Texas L. Rev. See Also 97 (2012).
69.  See, e.g., Stanford Law Review Online at www.stanfordlawreview.org/online; Michigan Law Review 
First Impressions, at www.michiganlawreview.org/first-impressions. 
Essay Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions.63 Second, authors can describe 
those methodologies in full detail in the Essay itself or in an accompanying appendix, as 
Mammen did in the study discussed in this article. By “full detail” I mean replicable detail: 
in sufficient detail to enable another researcher to replicate every step of the methodology 
(although not necessarily the precise results) of the study.64 Third, they can make their 
datasets available for subsequent review and analysis.65 Authors can also seek out and 
obtain peer review of the study methodology before beginning to code the data, so as to 
avoid making a design error in the early stages of the project. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, in many instances study authors may have great success working in teams, 
producing efficiencies and checks on one another while minimizing the risk of premature 
disclosure.66 While in some cases it may simply not be feasible to engage in multi-author 
scholarship, the advantages provided by this approach go beyond simply the effect on the 
methodological approach itself.67 
 Beyond engaging directly with the study author during the project itself, third-party 
scholars can also play a significant role in ensuring the quality of empirical legal studies 
by carefully reviewing those studies that are produced and published, and engaging in 
a productive dialogue about those studies. While there are scholars who provide useful 
post-publication commentary and criticism,68 the quality of empirical legal studies has 
the potential to be greatly improved by even greater engagement and critical review of 
published studies. Law reviews today offer a tremendous opportunity for exactly this type of 
commentary through the online supplements that nearly every major law review offers.69 
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70.  One limitation on full reproducibility is the fundamental issue that database contents can grow over time as 
more materials are collected within the database. As discussed above in footnote 39, however, this appears to 
introduce only a relatively small variation for the periods studied. 
71.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289.
72.  Indeed, many questions in law are fundamentally empirical questions that can only be addressed by 
conducting an empirical study. Everyone likes to spin theories, but only through empirical testing can those 
theories be truly assessed. 
Nor should scholars be the only ones to read empirical studies with a critical eye. The 
Mammen study was appropriately transparent; its methodology was clearly laid out in an almost 
fully reproducible fashion.70 The Committee Position Essay discussed in the introduction, and 
cited by the Federal Circuit in Therasense as a study that “estimated that eighty percent of 
patent infringement cases included allegations of inequitable conduct,”71 presents an even more 
extreme example in that it reports no actual data, let alone a methodology. While scholars have 
an important role to play in ensuring the quality of empirical studies themselves, courts and 
policy makers themselves need to assess empirical work from an objectively critical standpoint 
rather than blindly cite it even if it supports a preferred position. 
The goal of these suggestions is not to cast aspersions on empirical legal work, but rather 
to improve its quality. Empirical legal studies are an important tool for legal commentators, 
courts, and policymakers.72 They allow for the testing of empirical claims about the law and 
its effects, and provide evidence on which future decisionmakers can rely. Ensuring and 
improving the quality of empirical legal studies promotes both these goals: it allows the 
testing to be valid and increases the reliability of the evidence.
conclusion
The primary purpose of this Essay is to critique and build upon Mammen’s widely-
invoked 2009 empirical study of the rate at which inequitable conduct was pled and found 
by the Federal Circuit, and to offer some suggestions as to how the problems identified 
here could be avoided in the future. The results of the examination described in this Essay 
suggest that claims of inequitable conduct did increase during the first two-thirds of the last 
decade, although they did so at a much more modest rate than previously understood. More 
importantly, since 2008, the rate at which accused infringers have pled inequitable conduct 
has dropped precipitously. These results are significant, in that they call into question the 
extent to which previously-held assumptions about inequitable conduct were well-grounded 
in empirical reality, an important issue given recent developments by courts and the 
legislature to rein in the doctrine.
Given this landscape, there is a need for scholars to engage more closely with each others’ 
empirical studies, both during development and after publication. Courts and policymakers, 
too, have a role to play in assessing empirical work with a discerning eye, as opposed to 
passively citing the results.  
